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ABSTRACT 
A method for classifying attack implementations is a valuable structure for 
understanding attack implementations. An attack implementation is a specific way that an 
act, regardless of success, with the intention of causing harm or violating an explicit or 
implied security policy is done. The current state of computer security is that new attack 
implementations are being developed daily. Correspondingly, it is important for computer 
security professionals to be able to understand these attack implementations in order to 
develop more effective defenses. A method for classifying attack implementations will 
provide the basis for professionals to be able to develop attack implementation databases and 
to systematically study attack implementations. Each of these applications can be used to 
more fully understand attack implementations. 
A method for classifying attack implementations must be simple, unambiguous, 
comprehensive, and repeatable. These characteristics allow this method to be used in many 
different situations. A method for classifying attack implementations was developed that is 
based upon the primary objective of the attack implementation. Every attack implementation 
has exactly one primary objective. Correspondingly, a primary objective can be used to 
classify an attack implementation. A review of the possible resources of attack 
implementations was performed as part of an evaluation of this method for classifying attack 
implementations. This method for classifying attack implementations satisfies each of the 
four characteristics: simple, unambiguous, comprehensive, and repeatable. 
The method for classifying attack implementations presented in this research provides 
a valuable structure for studying attack implementations. This understanding will encourage 
future research and the development of methods for defending against computer attacks. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The state of today's computer security is that new vulnerabilities are being announced 
daily. Along with these new vulnerabilities, implementations that take advantage of these 
vulnerabilities are also being released. In the past few years there have been several attempts 
at classifying vulnerabilities in a common format. However, a comprehensive method for 
classifying attack implementations has not yet been established. The purpose of this research 
is to generate a simple, unambiguous, comprehensive, and repeatable method for classifying 
attack implementations. 
One of the reasons that a method for classifying attack implementations has not been 
created is that researchers have focused primarily on vulnerabilities. There are many reasons 
that research has focused primarily on vulnerabilities. One of these reasons is that if 
vulnerabilities were eliminated then attack implementations would correspondingly be 
eliminated. A second reason is the claim that only criminals need to understand attack 
implementations. Therefore, past research has focused primarily on vulnerabilities and has 
not focused on attack implementations. 
Today, however, there is a need to not only understand the vulnerabilities, but to also 
understand the implementations that take advantage of these vulnerabilities. A method for 
classifying attack implementations will serve as a valuable structure for studying attack 
implementations. The study of attack implementations will lead to a better understanding of 
the techniques attackers employ and will enable a more effective defense. One of the 
primary applications ofthis classification is the development of an attack implementation 
database. Another use for this classification is in the systematic study of attack 
implementations. 
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A database of attack implementations has many potential uses for increasing 
computer security. One particular use of a database of attack implementations is to 
understand and analyze the trends that attack implementations follow. These trends could be 
used to develop more effective defenses and to predict the impact of new attack 
implementations. Another use for a database of attack implementations is to test products 
against actual attack implementations instead of just benign implementations that are not 
fully functional. This is important because actual attacks perform differently than benign 
implementations and attackers will use actual attacks. This database of attack 
implementations could also be used in the testing of intrusion detections systems, penetration 
testing, and other auditing of network security. Overall, a database of attack implementations 
would provide many potential opportunities for increasing computer security. 
The classification of attack implementations will enable the systematic study of attack 
implementations. A classification of attack implementations would allow researchers to 
focus directly on specific classifications of attack implementations or to understand the 
relationships between different classifications of attack implementations. The resulting 
research would then lead to a greater understanding of attack implementations and 
correspondingly greater computer security. 
The structure of this paper is such that Chapter 2 contains information that is 
important to understanding attack implementations and a review of some of the relevant 
research that has been performed in the past. Chapter 3 presents a method for classifying 
attack implementations based upon the primary objective of the attack implementation. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the method for classifying attack implementations that was presented in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 presents future work and Chapter 6 is the conclusion. The major focus 
3 
of this paper is to establish a method for classifying attack implementations to encourage the 
future understanding of attack implementations. 
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CHAPTER2.BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this research is to develop a format for understanding attack 
implementations. In order to create a classification for attack implementations there are 
some things that need to be clarified and understood. One thing that is important to define is 
the terminology that is used. There are many different definitions for common terms within 
computer security; therefore, it is necessary to define the common terminology that is used in 
this paper so that the concepts found in this paper can be clearly understood. In the past, 
substantial vulnerability research has been performed to understand and classify 
vulnerabilities. Since attack implementations take advantage of vulnerabilities, it is 
important to understand the similarities and differences between vulnerabilities and attack 
implementations. These similarities and differences can then be used to apply the research of 
vulnerabilities to understanding attack implementations. Therefore, it is important to review 
the work that has been done on classifying vulnerabilities in order to transfer that know ledge 
to classifying attack implementations. A final thing that is important to understand is some 
existing vulnerability databases that have been created so that applications to understanding 
attack implementations can be made. The basis for this research is accomplished by clearly 
defining the relevant terminology, understanding the previous research that has been done, 
and understanding the applications of the previous research. 
2.1. Terminology 
One of the difficulties in dealing with computer security is determining the 
terminology being used. Many sources have contradicting definitions for specific terms. 
Therefore, part of this paper includes clearly defining some of the terms and related concepts 
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that are applicable for this research. The terms that will be focused on in this paper are 
"attack," "implementation," "attack implementation," "exploit," and "vulnerability." These 
terms are important to define because they are the terms that are most commonly used in 
reference to the subject of the paper. The major term used by this paper is "attack 
implementation"; therefore, it is important to define the terms "attack" and 
"implementation." The terms "vulnerability" and "exploit" are both closely related to attack 
implementations and often have unclear definitions. It is important that these five terms be 
clearly defined to provide a basis for understanding attack implementations. 
2.1.1. Attack 
One of the terms that is important to define for this research is the term attack. The 
definition that is used for this research is based on several different definitions for attack. 
John D. Howard [1] states that an attack is "a single unauthorized access attempt, or 
unauthorized use attempt, regardless of success." The American Heritage Dictionary [2], 
states that an attack is "The act or an instance of attacking; an assault." Based upon these 
two definitions, an attack is any act, regardless of success, with the intention of causing harm 
or violating an explicit or implied security policy. The four main parts of this definition are: 
1.) any act, regardless of success, 2.) with the intention, 3.) causing harm, and 4.) violating 
an explicit or implied security policy. The first part of the definition, any act, regardless of 
success, is important in that the results of the act do not distinguish whether or not the action 
is an attack. The second part of the definition, with the intention, is important to discern 
between actions that are designed to be malicious and actions that have negative unintended 
consequences. The third part of the definition, causing harm, is important because it 
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describes the situation that results from the actions taken as being malicious. The fourth part 
of the definition, violating an explicit or implied security policy, is important for two reasons. 
First, a violation of a security policy is the product of actions taken that may or may not be 
harmful, but are still considered an attack. Second, the concept that a security policy may be 
explicit or implied is important because there are wide ranges of targets; some targets have 
explicit security policies and other targets have only implied security policies. The violation 
of either an explicit or implied security policy is considered an attack. 
2.1.2. Implementation 
Since the focus of this paper is on attack implementations, another term that is very 
important to define is the term implementation. According to WordNet [3], the definition of 
implementation is "the act of implementing (providing a practical means for accomplishing 
something)." For the purpose of this research, an implementation is a specific way in which 
something is done. One of the key elements of this definition is that it is a specific way. This 
is important because there may be multiple ways to accomplish a specific task. Each way 
may follow a similar process; yet each of these different ways would be separate and distinct 
implementations. Sometimes within the computer field the term implementation is defined 
as a way of programming something. This definition is completely included within the given 
definition, but it is incomplete by not including methods for doing something outside of 
programming. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, an implementation is a specific 
way in which something is done. 
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2.1.3. Attack Implementation 
Since the main focus of this paper is attack implementations, it is important to define . 
attack implementations. The definitions for attack and for implementation can be combined 
to develop the definition for attack implementation. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
research, an attack implementation is a specific way that an act, regardless of success, with 
the intention of causing harm or violating an explicit or implied security policy is done. This 
definition includes programs that are written, step-by-step commands, and any other method 
for carrying out an attack. An important thing to note is that attack implementations can be 
used for legitimate purposes. When they are used for legitimate purposes they would not 
specifically be attack implementations, but rather would simply be implementations. 
However, for the remainder of this research the term "attack implementation" will be used 
regardless of whether the implementation's use is illegitimate or legitimate, as long as it 
could be used for an attack. 
2.1.4. Exploit 
While not used directly in this paper, the term exploit is important to define. It is an 
important term to define because it is a common term that is used in conjunction with some 
of the ideas within this research. In relation to this research, there are two different 
applicable definitions. The first definition of the term exploit is used in the noun form and 
can be understood as "An act or deed, especially a brilliant or heroic one" [2]. This 
definition is commonly used to describe a tool or other resource used in an attack. For 
example, an exploit is the program used to execute an attack; in this case, this program is the 
act or deed. The second definition of the term exploit is used in the verb form and can be 
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understood from the definition, "To employ to the greatest possible advantage: exploit one's 
talent" [2]. This definition is commonly used to describe how to take advantage of a 
vulnerability. For example, a tool exploits a vulnerability by performing some action; in this 
case, the tool takes advantage of the vulnerability. The first definition of the term exploit has 
a meaning similar to an attack implementation, and could be used for this research. 
However, the ambiguity and multiple definitions make it an inadequate word to use in this 
paper. 
2.1.5. Vulnerability 
Another important term to define is vulnerability; it is important because of its 
relationship to an attack implementation. According to John D. Howard [1], one definition 
of a vulnerability is "a flaw in a computer or network allowing unauthorized use or 
unauthorized access." The American Heritage Dictionary [2] gives the definition of 
vulnerable as "susceptible to attack." Correspondingly, a vulnerability would be something 
that is "susceptible to attack." In a computing system, the things that are susceptible to attack 
are the limitations and weaknesses of the system. Therefore, for this paper, a vulnerability is 
any limitation or weakness in a system. 
According to the MITRE Corporation [ 4], which maintains the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, "There is no definition for a 'vulnerability' that is 
acceptable to the entire community." This corporation listed several reasons for not having 
an acceptable definition for the term vulnerability; the main reason listed is that many 
definitions are either too specific or too general. The definition used for this research errs on 
the side of being too general. The reason for this is because attack implementations can be 
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developed to take advantage of any limitation or weakness regardless of whether it is a 
design constraint or a flaw in the system. Therefore, the definition for vulnerability needs to 
include all possible elements that could be taken advantage of. The definition of 
vulnerability used in this paper is any limitation or weakness in a system. 
2.2. Related Research 
As was described in the terminology section, there are distinct differences between 
vulnerabilities and attack implementations. Despite these differences, the research that has 
been performed on vulnerabilities can be used to gain a background for attack 
implementations and serves as a basis for developing a classification of attack 
implementations. Therefore, it is important to review and understand the work that has been 
done on vulnerabilities and to make applications to attack implementations. 
There has been a substantial amount of research done on vulnerabilities and 
classifying vulnerabilities. However, there has not been any substantial research that focuses 
on the classification of attack implementations as a whole. Th~re are several reasons why the 
research has been focused on vulnerabilities and not on attack implementations. One of the 
implied reasons is the claim that if vulnerabilities were eliminated then there would not be 
any attack implementations. Therefore, there would not be a need to understand attack 
implementations if vulnerabilities could be completely understood. However, since 
vulnerabilities are not completely understood and can not be effectively eliminated, it is 
important to understand attack implementations. 
Along these same lines, another reason for the focus on vulnerabilities is the claim 
that only criminals need to understand attack implementations. While this claim has almost 
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completely been abandoned, it is the basis for another claim which is that attack 
implementations do not have legitimate uses. In the past it has been thought that the only 
uses of attack implementations were for attacking networks. However, in order to 
understand and defend against attackers, it is important to understand not only the 
vulnerabilities, but also the attack implementations that are being used. The study of attack 
implementations will lead to a better understanding of the techniques attackers employ and 
will enable a more effective defense. 
In order to develop a format for understanding attack implementations, it is important 
to first understand the previous research that has been performed. There are a couple of 
sources that are helpful in understanding attack implementations; however, these sources are 
ineffective at classifying attack implementations. There is also previous research that 
focuses on classifying vulnerabilities that can be applied to classifying attack 
implementations. 
2.2.1. Protection Analysis: Final Report [5] 
This paper was one of the first papers to attempt to categorize and search for errors 
that cause security issues. The purpose of this paper was to find and analyze undiscovered 
errors. It focused primarily on a method for finding errors and extrapolating data from these 
errors to uncover further errors. This method consisted of recording raw data, and formatting 
the data into a common form. Once the data is in a common form, then the information is 
evaluated to determine any patterns, or other abstract data about the errors. While this 
process may have been able to develop a classification of vulnerabilities, the stringent 
demands that this process required forced the focus of this paper to change in order to 
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produce more results. Correspondingly, there would be similar requirements if this process 
was used to classify attack implementations. 
2.2.2. A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples [ 6] 
This paper is one of the first papers to attempt to categorize existing computer flaws. 
This taxonomy "classifies each flaw according to how, when, and where it was introduced 
into the system." It does this by classifying each flaw according to genesis, time of 
introduction, and location. The genesis classification describes how a security flaw was 
introduced. The time of introduction classification describes when a security flaw was 
introduced. The location classification describes where within a system the flaw in located. 
Each individual classification was divided into smaller selections. Every specific flaw can be 
classified according to all three types of the classifications. While every vulnerability has a 
genesis, a time of introduction, and a location, it is often difficult to determine this 
information from a specific vulnerability. This information is helpful in eliminating 
vulnerabilities; howeyer, it is not useful in distinguishing between vulnerabilities. Therefore, 
this paper provides a method for analyzing vulnerabilities but does not provide an adequate 
method for classifying vulnerabilities. 
2.2.3. A Taxonomy of UNIX System and Network Vulnerabilities [7] 
This paper develops a taxonomy to be used by an Intrusion Detection System. The 
taxonomy categorizes computer flaws according to vulnerability class, time of introduction, 
exploitation domain involved, effect domain, minimum number of processes, and source. 
Correspondingly, this information can be used by an Intrusion Detection System to correlate 
12 
when an attack has occurred. Therefore, while this paper looks at ways that vulnerabilities 
can be exploited, it does not attempt to categorize or study these techniques, but focuses on 
the vulnerabilities and the corresponding abstracted information. 
2.2.4. A Taxonomy of Computer Intrusions [8] 
One of the main focuses of this paper is the creation of a taxonomy to describe 
computer intrusions for the purpose of evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems. The use for 
this taxonomy was to be able to describe computer intrusions in terms that could be used to 
evaluate an Intrusion Detection System. There were three main properties that were 
abstracted about computer intrusions within this taxonomy: privilege level, actions, and 
methods of transition. When evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems, these abstractions are 
the characteristics that an Intrusion Detection System would be considering when detecting a 
computer intrusion. Since computer intrusions specifically violate security policies, 
computer intrusions are considered attacks. Therefore, these three main properties can be 
abstracted from attack implementations. However, for the purposes of classifying attack 
implementations, these properties do not maintain the differences between separate attack 
implementations. This taxonomy also requires that whoever uses it can understand the three 
different properties and can effectively abstract these details from an attack implementation. 
This process is often complex and difficult to use without special training or a high level of 
knowledge about the attack implementations. An important deficiency within this taxonomy 
is that it does not unambiguously place each attack implementation in its own category. For 
instance, some attacks may be categorized in multiple ways by this taxonomy. For the 
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purpose of evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems, this is not a problem; but for the purposes 
of classifying attack implementations, this is a deficiency that is not tolerable. 
2.2.5. An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet [1] 
The main purpose of this paper was to analyze the computer security incidents 
recorded by the CERT®/CC and to attempt to extrapolate patterns and trends that would be 
useful in improving computer security. One of the major accomplishments of this paper was 
the creation of a taxonomy of computer and network attacks. This paper then used the 
taxonomy to categorize the recorded data from the CERT®/CC. The results of the 
categorization were then analyzed to determine trends and to determine future changes and 
policy guidelines. This paper was focused primarily on security incidents. This focus was 
directly associated with the type of data recorded by the CERT®/CC and with the types of 
information the CERT®/CC is designed to deal with. The definition that this paper uses for 
an incident is "a group of attacks that can be distinguished from other incidents because of 
the distinctiveness of the attackers, and the degree of similarity of sites, techniques, and 
timing" [1]. This focus on incidents changes the perspective in which the term attack is used. 
This paper sees an attack as an event that has occurred. Correspondingly, the information 
about attacks that is important in this paper is the details about what occurred and not how 
the attacks occurred or were implemented. Therefore, while the taxonomy presented in this 
paper was useful in analyzing incidents, there is a limited usefulness in the classification of 
attack implementations. 
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2.3. Vulnerability Databases 
There are several commonly known vulnerability databases. Two well known 
databases are the CERT® Coordination Center and the NIST ICAT Metabase. There are also 
other vulnerability databases that can be found on the Internet. It is important to understand 
vulnerability databases because some of the same ideas found in vulnerability databases can 
be used in attack implementation databases. It is also important to understand the 
applications of vulnerability research upon the creation of vulnerability databases. 
Therefore, a review and understanding of some common vulnerability databases will provide 
information about what is stored in the vulnerability databases and how that information 
could be applied to attack implementation databases. 
2.3.1. CERT® Coordination Center 
One resource that is commonly referenced when dealing with computer attacks is the 
CERT® Coordination Center (CERT®/CC). This organization serves as a focal point in 
dealing with computer attacks. According to the CERT®/CC website [9]: 
The CERT/CC is a major reporting center for Internet security problems. Staff 
members provide technical advice and coordinate responses to security compromises, 
identify trends in intruder activity, work with other security experts to identify 
solutions to security problems, and disseminate information to the broad community. 
The CERT ICC also analyzes product vulnerabilities, publishes technical documents, 
and presents training courses. 
Accordingly, CERT®/CC maintains a database of vulnerabilities, and serves as a resource 
for publishing these vulnerabilities. This database of vulnerabilities includes information 
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such as descriptions, impacts, solutions, and the systems affected. The information that is 
available in this database deals specifically with the vulnerability and does not provide any 
information on attack implementations that exploit these vulnerabilities. Therefore, while 
this database is useful for examining vulnerabilities, it is not useful in classifying attack 
implementations. 
2.3.2. National Institute of Standards and Technology's ICAT Metabase 
Another resource commonly referenced when dealing with computer attacks is the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology's ICAT Metabase. As described by the 
ICAT website [ 1 O], "The ICAT project was initially intended as a database of Internet attacks 
used by hackers." This focus would be directly related to the categorization of attack 
implementations. However, the focus of this project changed to become a "fine-grained 
searchable index of standardized vulnerabilities that links users into publicly available 
vulnerability and patch information" [11]. To implement this new focus, this resource 
maintains a database of information about vulnerabilities. This database does not include 
actual vulnerabilities, but rather links to other vulnerability databases. However, this 
resource does maintain a database of specific information about each vulnerability to 
facilitate precise searching. This specific information includes the software affected, the 
vendor, the vulnerability type, and other information used to distinguish between 
vulnerabilities. This database does not include information about classifying attack 
implementations. However, it does includes significant information about vulnerabilities; 
this information could correspondingly be used in an attack implementation database. 
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2.3.3. Other Vulnerability Databases 
There are many other vulnerability databases. Some of the popular vulnerability 
databases are SecurityFocus [12], Neohapsis [13], and X-Force [14]. Some of the 
information included in these databases is the location of the vulnerability, the type of 
vulnerability, and some possible solutions. Sometimes, in order to show a proof of concept, 
these databases will include sample code that can be used to verify the vulnerability. 
Sometimes these samples are actual attack implementations. However, most of these 
samples are not fully functional and are correspondingly not attack implementations. These 
vulnerability databases focus primarily on the vulnerabilities and do not focus on attack 
implementations. Therefore, these resources do not classify attack implementations, but 
rather classify vulnerabilities. Due to the relationship between vulnerabilities and attack 
implementations, the understanding of these vulnerability databases will encourage the 
development of attack implementation databases. 
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CHAPTER 3. OBJECTIVES BASED CLASSIFICATION 
One of the key elements of this research is the classification of attack 
implementations. A method for classifying attack implementations will serve as a valuable 
structure for understanding and researching attack implementations. This research develops 
a classification based upon the primary objective of an attack implementation. 
3.1. Development of a Method for Classification 
One of the elements of this research is to generate a method that can be used for 
classifying attack implementations. In order for this type of method to be useful it must have 
the following characteristics: repeatable, unambiguous, comprehensive, and simple. These 
characteristics are important to the development of this type of method because they allow 
the method to be used by numerous people for an assortment of purposes. 
3.1.1. Repeatable 
It is important for this type of method to be repeatable in order for it to be useful. 
One of the measures of the usefulness of a method is whether or not an anticipated result 
occurs each time a method is used. If a method consistently reproduces the expected results, 
then it can be used for more applications. If the results are unexpected then there are limits as 
to what the method can be used for; this is because the method would be umeliable and 
inconsistent. Therefore, it is important that each time a method is used that the same 
outcome occurs. It is also important that when a method is used by multiple individuals that 
it produces similar results. There are many instances where there are multiple people that 
each need to use a specific method to perform a task. In these situations the method should 
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produce the same results regardless of the individual performing the task. Overall, there 
should be a high probability that the same results will occur each time a method is used. 
3.1.2. Unambiguous 
Another important feature for a method is to be unambiguous. This is important 
because it allows the method to be used in a clear and decisive method and reduces the 
number of errors because each possible choice is distinct. Ambiguity reduces the 
repeatability of a method and causes a method to be difficult to use. An unambiguous 
method can be easily used without requiring vast amounts of previous knowledge and can be 
quickly utilized. Overall, an unambiguous method will be efficient, effective, easy to use for 
different tasks, and enable its use in unfamiliar situations. 
3.1.3. Comprehensive 
A method must be comprehensive; that is, it must be useful for every legitimate 
application of the method. One example of the comprehensiveness of a method is whether or 
not a new item will be able to be classified by the method. Therefore, a method must be 
comprehensive to include not only current situations, but also be able to be used for future 
situations as well. 
3.1.4. Simple 
This type of method must also be simple. It is important for the method to be simple 
because multiple people of various abilities and with different uses will need to be able to use 
the same method. It is also important to be simple in order to reduce the complexity of a 
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method; the greater the complexity involved, the greater the probability of errors occurring. 
One key issue of simplicity that this method must possess is that it must be self-explanatory. 
This requires that the method be logical, and its use must be intuitive. This self-explanatory 
nature will increase the effectiveness in which this method is used. Therefore, it is important 
for a method to be simple so that it is easy to use and will produce accurate results. 
3.2. Classification by Primary Objective 
This research proposes a classification of attack implementation based upon the 
primary objective of the attack implementation. The primary objective of an attack 
implementation is simply the most important thing that an attack implementation is meant to 
do. Attack implementation can have secondary objectives, but every attack implementation 
can only have one primary objective. It is also important to point out that every attack 
implementation has a primary objective. Therefore, every individual attack implementation 
can only be classified in exactly one way. There are eight objectives described in this 
research. The objectives are as follows: 
1. Gain unauthorized use 
2. Access unauthorized data 
3. Masquerade as normal software but to have abnormal uses 
4. Deny service 
5. Propagate malicious code 
6. Solicit a user 
7. Improperly gain information that could be used for further attacks 
8. Violate local account restrictions 
An attack implementation can be described by the sentence: "The [Name of attack 
implementation] attack implementation is primarily used to [objective]." This sentence 
allows an attack implementation to be easily described by its primary objective. It also 
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enables individuals to easily classify attack implementations by simply describing the attack 
implementations and then focusing specifically on what the attack implementation is 
designed to be used for. 
The individual objectives will be described in the following sections. For each 
objective there will be a description of the objective, why the objective is an attack, and an 
example attack implementation whose primary objective is the particular objective. 
3.2.1. Gain Unauthorized Use 
This objective is entitled "Gain Unauthorized Use." This objective describes any 
attack that is designed to gain control of or to use a target's resource without authorization. 
Some examples of attacks that gain unauthorized use are buffer overflows that produce 
command shells or password guessing. This objective includes any type of attack that allows 
an attacker to produce a command shell, run a command, execute specific code, or in some 
way control the target. 
This is an attack because it enables an attacker to gain unauthorized control of a 
target. This would not be an attack if the attacker had authorized use of a target, but since the 
use is unauthorized, it is an attack. This is an attack because every target has the implied 
security policy that only authorized individuals have access to use the target; therefore, every 
use of the target that is not authorized is an attack. It is important to note that public web 
servers authorize all users to read html pages, but authorize only a few users to run shell 
commands on the web server. 
An example of an attack implementation with this objective as the primary objective 
is the attack entitled "linux_httpd.c" found on HoobieNet [15] webpage. The vulnerability 
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that is taken advantage of is found in the NCSA httpd server version 1.3 running in Linux on 
an Intel processor. This attack implementation takes advantage of this vulnerability and 
produces a command shell. Therefore, the "linux _ httpd.c" is used to gain unauthorized use. 
3.2.2. Access Unauthorized Data 
This objective is entitled "Access Unauthorized Data." This objective describes any 
attack that is designed to access unauthorized data. Some examples of attacks that access 
unauthorized data are cross site scripting or SQL query injection. This objective includes 
any type of attack that gives an attacker the ability to read or obtain data that the target does 
not allow the attacker to access. 
This is an attack because it enables an attacker to acquire data that the source intends 
to remain confidential. Like the "Gain Unauthorized Use" category this would not be an 
attack if the attacker had authorized access to the data, but since it is unauthorized, it is an 
attack. This is an attack because all data has the implied security policy that only authorized 
individuals can access that data; therefore, any unauthorized access to data is an attack. 
An example of an attack implementation with its primary objective to access 
unauthorized data is the attack entitled "php_exploit.c" found on HoobieNet [15] webpage. 
The vulnerability that is taken advantage of is found in some example scripts found in early 
versions of php that do not correctly limit the incoming data. This attack implementation 
takes advantage of this vulnerability by entering data that should not be authorized but was 
not correctly limited. This incorrectly limited data allows any file on the system to be read. 
Correspondingly, since the attacker does not have access to all the files on a system, the 
"php _ exploit.c" is used to access unauthorized data. 
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3.2.3. Masquerade as Normal Software but to Have Abnormal Uses 
This objective is entitled "Masquerade as normal software but to have abnormal 
uses." It describes any attack that disguises its true identity while performing hidden 
activities. Some examples of attacks that masquerade as normal software but have abnormal 
uses are trojan login programs, backdoors, and other trojan processes. This objective 
includes any attacks that remain in plain sight at all times, and may even perform legitimate 
tasks, but also perform some hidden or unusual activities as well. 
This is an attack because the hidden or unusual activities performed by this attack 
violate the security policy for a target. For example, a trojan login program violates the 
security by allowing unauthorized logins on a target machine. Likewise, a trojan program 
that runs in the background and captures traffic violates the security policy by accessing 
unauthorized data. In addition to the security policy violations by the hidden activities, the 
inherent masquerading is deceptive and correspondingly harmful to the target. 
An example of an attack implementation with the primary objective to masquerade as 
normal software but to have abnormal uses is entitled "intruderf.c" found on HoobieNet [15] 
webpage. This attack implementation is a program that disguises itself as a program that is 
used to check for vulnerabilities. Instead of actually checking for vulnerabilities, this attack 
implementation records the usemame and password of the individual running the program 
and sends it in an email to the attacker. Overall, this attack implementation masquerades as a 
vulnerability scanner but instead sends an email to the attacker with the usemame and 
password of the user. Therefore, this attack implementation's primary objective is to 
masquerade as normal software but to have abnormal uses. 
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3.2.4. Deny Service 
This objective is entitled "Deny Service." This objective describes any attack with 
the intention to impair the ability of a target's resource to function correctly. Some examples 
of attacks that deny service are smurf attacks, causing a program to crash, and deleting files. 
This objective includes any attack that is designed to destroy, degrade, or interfere with the 
availability of a target's resource. 
This is an attack because the attacker's intention is to cause harm to a target's 
resource. The harm is caused by the intentional denial of service caused by this attack to the 
target's resource. This is not an attack when the intention is not harmful. For example, when 
a major news event happens and many people go to a news website, the sudden traffic surge 
may cause the news website's service to be degraded and even discontinued; this situation is 
not an attack. However, when several people decide that they do not like a website and in 
tum reload the page to attempt to degrade the service of the website, this situation is an 
attack. 
An example of an attack implementation with the primary objective to deny service is 
entitled "ntpptp.c" found on HoobieNet [15] webpage. This attack implementation takes 
advantage of a vulnerability in the point-to-point tunneling protocol. This vulnerability 
causes the operating system to crash when an invalid packet is received by the point-to-point 
tunneling protocol. Therefore, this attack implementation creates and sends an invalid packet 
to a target machine running the point-to-point tunneling protocol. When this attack 
implementation is executed the target machine's operating system will crash, denying service 
to the machine. Therefore, the primary objective of this attack implementation is to deny 
service. 
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3.2.5. Propagate Malicious Code 
This objective is entitled "Propagate Malicious Code." This objective describes any 
attack designed to spread harmful code. Some examples of attacks that propagate malicious 
code are viruses and worms. This objective includes any attack that is designed to spread 
harmful code without a target's authorization. 
This is an attack because it spreads malicious code without proper authorization. If 
code was authorized to propagate by both a sender and a receiver then it would not be an 
attack. Since it is unauthorized by either a sender or a receiver, then it violates that entity's 
security policy. Another feature of these attacks is that they propagate malicious code. Since 
the code is malicious, it is inherently harmful, thereby qualifying it as an attack. An 
automated patching script would not be an attack if it was authorized, but would be an attack 
if it was not authorized. Malicious code sent as an automated script would be an attack, 
whether or not it was authorized. 
An example attack implementation with the primary objective to propagate malicious 
code is entitled "W32.SQLExp.Worm" and is described on the Symantec Security Response 
[ 16] webpage. This attack implementation is more commonly referred to as the Slammer 
Worm. This attack implementation is designed to reproduce itself by infecting other 
machines. Once a machine has been infected, this worm attempts to infect other machines in 
a similar manner. Therefore, the primary objective of this attack implementation is to 
propagate malicious code. 
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3.2.6. Solicit a User 
This objective is entitled "Solicit a user." This objective describes any unwanted 
attack that is designed to persuade a human operator to perform some action. Some 
examples of attacks that solicit users are spam, fake emails, virus hoaxes, and social 
engineering. This objective includes any attack with the objective to persuade a user to do 
something harmful and also includes any unwanted attempt at persuasion. 
This is an attack because it uses a target's resources in an unwanted or improper way, 
thus violating the security policy. It is also an attack because the attacker attempts to entice a 
user into performing some harmful action. 
An example attack implementation with the primary objective to solicit a user is 
entitled "FROGAPULT, ELFBOWL, Y2KGAME Virus Hoax" and is described on the 
Symantec Security Response [17] webpage. This attack implementation is an email that 
includes instructions for the user to spread the information contained in the email and to 
delete specific programs. This email is unable to spread itself or to delete the specific 
programs. However, the contents of the email are structured to make the user think that they 
should follow these instructions to spread the contents of the email and to delete the specific 
programs. Therefore, this attack implementation's primary objective is to solicit a user. 
3.2.7. Improperly Gain Information that could be used for further Attacks 
This objective is entitled "Improperly gain information that could be used for further 
attacks." This objective describes any attacks that do not explicitly cause harm to a target, 
but instead gather information that could be used for further attacks. These attacks do not 
require the information to actually be used for further attacks, but only to be potentially 
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useful for further attacks. Some examples of attacks that improperly gain information that 
could be used for further attacks are port scans, ping sweeps, trace routes, and traffic 
capturing. This objective includes any attack that does not specifically harm a target, but 
rather gathers information that could be used for further attacks. 
This is an attack because the information gathered by these attacks violates the 
security policy of the target. The methods for gathering information can be used by 
authorized entities without being an attack because the information gathered would not be 
able to be used for further attacks. If a network administrator enables traffic capturing to 
evaluate the status of his or her network, this is not an attack since the network administrator 
is authorized to evaluate the traffic present on the network. Also, the traffic that is captured 
in this method is used in an authorized manner and not for further attacks. However, if an 
attacker enables traffic capturing but does not capture any traffic, it is still an attack, since the 
intent and the authorization does not change regardless of the amount of information gained. 
An example of an attack implementation with the primary objective to improperly 
gain information that could be used for further attacks is entitled nmap and can be found at 
Insecure.org [18]. According to Insecure.org [18], 
Nmap uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine what hosts are available on the 
network, what services (application name and version) they are offering, what 
operating system (and OS version) they are running, what type of packet 
filters/firewalls are in use, and dozens of other characteristics. 
Nmap can be used to remotely find information about a target. Information such as the 
operating system can be used by an attacker to design attacks that are functional against a 
specific operating system. Since certain attackers do not know the operating system of a 
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target, running nmap on the target will improperly provide the attacker that information. 
Therefore, nmap is an attack implementation that has the primary objective to improperly 
gain information that could be used to further attacks. 
3.2.8. Violate Local Account Restrictions 
This objective is entitled "Violate Local Account Restrictions." This objective 
describes any attacks that attempt to break the limitations imposed upon a local account. 
Some examples of attacks that violate local account restrictions are reading and writing files 
at different permission levels and changing account privileges. This objective includes any 
attacks that are performed as a local user to intentionally violate restrictions or privileges 
placed upon that user's account. 
This is an attack because it explicitly violates a security policy by violating the 
restrictions or privileges placed upon an account. An example of this type of attack is a 
buffer overflow that allows a user to obtain enhanced privileges; this is an attack because the 
user is not using an authorized or correct method for obtaining .enhanced privileges. 
However, if a local user correctly uses a command to obtain enhanced privileges this is not 
an attack since the local user has the authorization to obtain enhanced privileges and did so in 
an authorized manner. 
An example of an attack implementation with the primary objective to violate local 
account restrictions is entitled "linux_perl.txt" found on HoobieNet [15] webpage. This 
attack implementation enables any user that has access to a specific version of perl to gain 
root privileges. This attack implementation performs this task by taking advantage of a 
vulnerability in a specific version of perl to obtain access to a shell with root privileges. 
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Since the program that has the vulnerability can only be accessed by a local user, this attack 
implementation has the primary objective to violate local account restrictions. 
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CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION OF CLASSIFICATION 
This chapter will evaluate the method for classifying attack implementations 
according to its primary objective. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are four characteristics 
that are important for the development of a method for classifying attack implementations. 
These characteristics are repeatable, unambiguous, comprehensive, and simple. The method 
for classifying attack implementations will be evaluated according to each of these 
characteristics. 
4.1. Repeatable 
The first characteristic is repeatable. There are two key components of this method 
for classifying attack implementations that make it repeatable. The first key component is 
that every attack implementation has exactly one primary objective. The second key 
component is that the primary objective an attack implementation never changes. When 
these two key components are combined, the result is that every attack implementation has 
exactly one primary objective that is always the same. Therefore, if an attack 
implementation is classified several times, it will always have the same result. Also, if 
multiple people each classify an attack implementation, they will all return the same result. 
Therefore, this method for classifying attack implementations is repeatable. 
4.2. Unambiguous 
The second characteristic is unambiguous. In order to determine whether this method 
for classifying attack implementations is unambiguous, the ambiguity of the eight objectives 
must be evaluated. There is some ambiguity between some of the objectives. 
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One example of ambiguity is between the objective to access unauthorized data and 
to improperly gain information that could be used for further attacks. For example, an attack 
implementation could access unauthorized data to use for further attacks. This would 
produce an uncertainty in classifying the attack implementation. However, the primary 
objective of this attack would not just be to access the data, but rather to use the data for 
further attacks. 
Another example of ambiguity is between the objective to violate local account 
restrictions and the objectives to gain unauthorized use and to access unauthorized data. An 
example is that an attack implementation gains unauthorized use by violating a local account 
restriction. Another example is that an attack implementation accesses unauthorized data by 
violating a local account restriction. However, for each of these attack implementations the 
primary objective would be to violate local account restrictions, even though it could be 
classified under the other two objectives. 
Therefore, there is some ambiguity found in this method for classifying attack 
implementations. The ambiguity in this method is a direct result of ambiguity in the eight 
objectives. However, much of this ambiguity can be removed by thoroughly focusing on the 
overall primary objective. Specifically, an attack implementation can be described by the 
sentence: "The [Name of attack implementation] attack implementation is primarily used to 
[objective]." By using this sentence, this method for classifying attack implementations is 
almost completely unambiguous. 
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4.3. Comprehensive 
The third characteristic is comprehensive. The only way to absolutely determine if 
the method for classifying attack implementations is comprehensive is to classify every 
single attack implementation. However, this is not feasible. Therefore, another way to 
determine if the method for classifying attack implementations is comprehensive is to 
evaluate the possible resources of attack implementations to determine ifthere are any attack 
implementations that can not be classified. The following section will evaluate the resources 
of attack implementations available on the Internet. The overall, result is that the method for 
categorizing attack implementations is comprehensive. 
4.3.1. Resources of Attack Implementations 
There are many resources of attack implementations available on the Internet. Many 
of these resources do not contain attack implementations with every one of the primary 
objectives, but rather focus on a single objective or set of objectives. These resources are 
maintained by a variety of different organizations from individuals, groups, companies, and 
government agencies. There are both legitimate resources such as network security sites and 
educational resources and illegitimate resources such as websites devoted to malicious 
actions. This chapter will focus primarily on the legitimate sources of attack 
implementations. 
4.3.1.1. Full Disclosure Security Sites 
One common resource found on the Internet is full disclosure security sites. The 
primary focus of these websites is to publish vulnerability information. Sometimes these 
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resources include proof of concept implementations that take advantage of the specified 
vulnerabilities. These proof of concept implementations can be used by security 
professionals to test for the vulnerabilities and to better understand the vulnerabilities. 
However, these implementations can also be used by attackers. These resources contain 
many different attack implementations with a variety of primary objectives. To further 
understand the types of attack implementations found at these resources and to determine the 
usefulness of the objectives based method, two full disclosure security sites were analyzed to 
determine the diversity of attack implementations. These sites are Packet Storm Security 
[19] and HoobieNet [15]. 
4.3.1.1.1. Background of Analysis. The two sites that were chosen, Packet Storm 
Security and HoobieNet were chosen because they both contained a specific section for 
attack implementations, and they both contained a large number of attack implementations. 
Both of these sites entitled their attack implementations as "exploits." For each attack 
implementation, these websites included a brief description of the attack implementation and 
a file that included the actual attack implementation. For each attack implementation that 
was analyzed, the information that was recorded included the primary objective, the name of 
the attack implementation file, and the date that the attack implementation was analyzed. To 
determine the primary objective for each attack implementation, the brief description was 
first read. If this description contained enough information about the attack implementation, 
then it was categorized accordingly. If this description did not contain enough information, 
then the file that included the actual attack implementation was examined to attempt to 
determine the primary objective. Since none of the actual attack implementations were 
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executed, it is possible that there were some errors accordingly. There were some attack 
implementations that were listed for which the attack implementation was not found; these 
implementations were labeled as "Not Found." There were also some implementations that 
were not attack implementations and were labeled as "Not Attacks." Some of these 
implementations that were not attacks were security enhancing programs, and product 
patches. 
4.3.1.1.2. Packet Storm Security. One of the websites that was analyzed is Packet 
Storm Security. This website is a full disclosure website pertaining to computer security 
issues. One of the major sections within this website is a list of "exploits." This list contains 
a large number of attack implementations. At the time of this writing, this site contained 
attack implementations from the year 1999 through the year 2004. As a result, there are a 
large number of attack implementations contained on this website. For this research, only the 
attack implementations in the first four months of 2003 are analyzed. In these four months, 
there were a total of 116 entries. These results are shown in Table 4.1. 
The diversity of attack implementations analyzed at Packet Storm Security is fairly 
limited, as can be seen in Table 4.1. There were not any attack implementations with the 
primary objective to propagate malicious code, to solicit a user, or to improperly gain 
information that could be used for further attacks. The majority of the attack 
implementations had a primary objective to gain unauthorized use or to violate local account 
restrictions. These results are expected because of the nature of the Packet Storm Security 
website. According to the Packet Storm website [20], "Packet Storm is an extremely large 
and current security tools resource." Correspondingly, the attack implementations that are 
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Table 4.1. Results of Packet Storm Security 
Primary Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity 
Ob.iective Jan.2003 Feb.2003 Mar.2003 Apr. 2003 Total 
Gain unauthorized use 11 3 14 18 46 
Access unauthorized 1 3 7 2 13 
data 
Masquerade as normal 1 4 3 1 9 
software but to have 
abnormal uses 
Deny service 2 2 1 10 15 
Propagate malicious 0 0 0 0 0 
code 
Solicit a user 0 0 0 0 0 
Improperly gain 0 0 0 0 0 
information that could 
be used for further 
attacks 
Violate local account 2 9 14 8 33 
restrictions 
Total 17 21 39 39 116 
included in the "exploits" section are primarily tools that can be used for computer security. 
For example, if a computer security professional found a vulnerability and wanted to 
demonstrate a proof of concept that takes advantage of that vulnerability, the professional 
would most likely create an implementation that has the primary objective either to gain 
unauthorized use or to access unauthorized data. These same professionals are not likely to 
create an implementation with the primary objective to propagate malicious code because 
this objective is seen as uncontrollable and unnecessary. Implementations with the primary 
objective to solicit a user are not found on this website because this website deals with the 
technical issues in computer security and not the human issues, which are required to solicit a 
user. It would be expected for this website to include implementations with the primary 
objective to improperly gain information that could be used for further attacks, since many 
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of those implementations are tools that a computer security professional would use. The 
reason for this lack of implementations is that this website does not include implementations 
with that objective in the "exploits" section, but rather in a section for "tools." Overall, the 
results that were found at this website match the anticipated results. 
4.3.1.1.3. HoobieNet. Another website that had a large number of attack 
implementations that were not classified is HoobieNet [15]. This website is maintained by a 
single individual and includes a list of 371 different "exploits." The attack implementations 
found in this list are dated to approximately 1997. For this research, only 150 attack· 
implementations were analyzed. The results are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Results of Hoobie.net 
Primary Ob_jective Quantity 
Gain unauthorized use 19 
Access unauthorized data 5 
Masquerade as normal software but to have abnormal uses 8 
Deny service 27 
Propagate malicious code 0 
Solicit a user 0 
Improperly gain information that could be used for further attacks 20 
Violate local account restrictions 45 
Sub Total 124 
Not Found 13 
Not Attack 13 
Total 150 
The results of the attack implementations analyzed were fairly well distributed. 
Except for the primary objectives to propagate malicious code and to solicit a user, all of the 
other primary objectives were adequately represented. This list is maintained by a single 
individual and therefore includes all of the attack implementations in a single list. This 
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characteristic of the list explains the distribution of implementations. Implementations with 
the primary objectives to propagate malicious code or to solicit a user are not often included 
in lists similar to this list because many individuals do not find legitimate uses for these 
objectives and correspondingly do not encourage the distribution or study of attack 
implementations with these primary objectives. 
4.3.1.2. Malicious Code Propagation Resources 
Typically sources that contain attack implementations with the primary objective to 
propagate malicious code usually do not contain any other attack implementations. 
Sometimes these sources do also include attack implementations with the primary objective 
to masquerade as normal software but to have abnormal uses. Some of these sources 
include attack implementations in the form of viruses, worms, and trojans. These sources 
will also sometimes include tools that would be useful for creating these attack 
implementations. The sources that that include these attack implementations are usually 
focused solely on these objectives and do not include attack implementations with other 
objectives. Correspondingly, many of the sites contain attack implementations with other 
objectives do not contain attack implementations with this objective. The primary reason for 
these trends is that the legitimacy of attack implementations with the primary objective to 
propagate malicious code is often questioned; this causes professionals to avoid these attack 
implementations. 
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4.3.1.3. User Solicitation Resources 
There are many sources that contain information about attack implementations with 
the primary objective to solicit a user. There is information about these types of attack 
implementations by sources that promote these implementations and sources that oppose 
these implementations. For example, unsolicited emails are examples of attack 
implementations with this primary objective. There are many individuals, such as Richard 
W.M. Jones [21], that are opposed to unsolicited emails and maintain databases full of the 
unsolicited email they have received. They maintain these databases so that the email can be 
studied, and methods for blocking the email can be created. There are also sources that 
promote these types of attacks; these sources provide tools to defeat unsolicited email 
blocking mechanisms and methods for creating fake emails, both which enable an attacker to 
send unsolicited email. Another example of attack implementations with the primary 
objective to solicit a user are virus hoaxes. Many different sources provide information 
about sample virus hoaxes. Some of the sources include antivirus manufactures Symantec 
Security Response [22], McAfee Security [23] and government organization CIAC [24]. 
These sources analyze these attack implementations and provide services to deal with these 
attacks. However, there are not common legitimate resources that provide information about 
performing these attacks. Overall, a majority of the sources that have information about 
attack implementations with a primary objective to solicit a user are sources that are 
opposing these types of attacks. 
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4.3.1.4. Network Security Resources 
Another common source of attack implementations are network security tool 
resources. These sources usually contain information that network administrators would use 
in the maintenance of their networks. Some of the information is in the form of best 
practices or security enhancing programs, but there are also tools used to gain information 
about a network. Correspondingly many of the tools that are used by network administrators 
for legitimate purposes to gain information about their own networks can be used by 
attackers for malicious purposes. Therefore, many of these tools are also considered attack 
implementations. Specifically, many of the tools that can be considered as attack 
implementations have the primary objective to improperly gain information that could be 
used for further attacks. There are many types of these resources from individuals such as 
Insecure.org [25], to companies such as @stake, Inc. [26], and even government sources such 
as DOE-CIAC [27]. Many of the tools found at these sources are well-known by both 
security professionals and attackers alike. 
4.4. Simple 
The fourth characteristic that is important for the development of a method for 
classifying attack implementations is simple. The method for classifying attack 
implementations according to their primary objectives does have the characteristic of being 
simple. This method is easy to use, not complex, and self-explanatory. The method can be 
easily used by simply describing what the attack implementation is designed to do and then 
determining the primary objective. The method is not complex, because there are only eight 
objectives, and each objective is described in a straightforward and clear manner. Finally, 
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the method is self-explanatory because the classification of attack implementations based 
upon the primary objective is easy to understand. 
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CHAPTER 5. FUTURE WORK 
There is a lot of work left to do in order to completely understand attack 
implementations. There are two primary paths of future work that directly result from a 
method for classifying attack implementations: the creation of attack implementation 
databases and the systematic study of attack implementations. 
There is a lot of future work that can be done with the creation of an attack 
implementation database. One specific task could be the population of an attack 
implementation database. There is an enormous amount of attack implementations available, 
so classifying an adequate number of attack implementations would be a significant 
achievement. While the method for classifying attack implementations based on the primary 
objective provides a top level classification, each top level classification could potentially be 
subdivided into subcategories. These subcategories would encourage more future research 
by clearly dividing the field and focusing the scope of the research. There is also a lot of 
future work that results from possessing an attack implementation database. This database 
could be used for testing systems using actual attack implementations and for developing 
other defenses against attacks. Using actual attack implementations will test products more 
fully and will evaluate how they really perform against attacks. Sample attack scenarios 
could be performed using real attack implementations to determine the potential outcomes. 
These scenarios could be repeated several times with different inputs to determine responses 
for attack scenarios. This database could also be used to correlate information about attack 
implementation trends and to determine the relationships between different attack 
implementations. This information would be useful in understanding how attack 
implementations are created, and to predict future attack implementations. Overall, an attack 
41 
implementation database provides a building block that can be used to more fully understand 
attack implementations and to develop defenses from them. 
The other path for future work is the systematic study of attack implementations. The 
method of classifying attack implementations enables individual classifications of attack 
implementations to be studied independently of the other classifications. Therefore, 
researchers can focus their research more precisely. As the systematic study of attack 
implementations progresses, new methods of defending against specific attack 
implementation classifications will be developed, in turn increasing overall computer 
security. 
There is a lot of significant research that could be done due to the creation of a 
method of classifying attack implementations. Since vulnerabilities are constantly being 
uncovered and new attack implementations are being developed, it is important for future 
research to focus on understanding attack implementations. This research will promote more 
effective product testing, better response techniques, and an overall increase in computer 
security. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research is to generate a simple, unambiguous, comprehensive, 
and repeatable method for classifying attack implementations. The method proposed in this 
research is a classification based upon the primary objective of an attack implementation. 
This classification can be used by researchers to further understand attack implementations. 
The more that is understood about attack implementations, the better prepared that computer 
security professionals will be to respond to attacks. 
While in the past there was significant research on vulnerabilities, there was little 
research focused on attack implementations. Therefore, a method for classifying attack 
implementations did not exist before this paper. This paper developed a method for 
classifying an attack implementations according to its primary objective. This was done by 
understanding the past research, defining the terminology, presenting the method for 
classification, and evaluating the method. 
While the number of vulnerabilities continues to increase, the number of attack 
implementations also increases. Therefore, in order to develop better defenses, attack 
implementations must be more fully understood. A method for classifying attack 
implementations that is simple, unambiguous, comprehensive, and repeatable provides a 
structure for developing future attack implementation research. By understanding attack 
implementations, the methods that attackers use will be better understood. Correspondingly, 
the overall state of computer security will be enhanced. 
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